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Expulsion in California Public
High Schools- Due Process
a Decade After Dixon
BETTY E. BOONE*
"No State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law..."
-Fourteenth Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION
Is a California public high school pupil entitled to notice and an
opportunity for a hearing before being expelled for misconduct?
If so, then is he entitled to a full-dress judicial-type hearing, with
any or all of the features of a civil or criminal trial, such as legal
representation, confrontation and cross-examination?
If he is entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing, but
not to a full-dress, judicial-type hearing, then what is the nature of
the hearing to which he is entitled?
These and related questions are being posed increasingly by
* Deputy County Counsel, County of San Diego; J.D., University of
San Diego School of Law, B.A., Centenary College.
Note, the opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Office of the County Counsel.
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those in the educational and legal fields and are engendering a great
deal of public interest. The answers may be gleaned from a study
of history, the application of reason, and review of past decisions in
the field of student discipline and it is the purpose of this article to
suggest the answers through an exploration of these avenues.
Caveat: The goal of this article is limited to the examination of
the state of the law as it pertains or would seem to pertain to Cali-
fornia public high school pupil expulsions. Suspensions of Cali-
fornia public high school pupils are the subject of extensive statutory
provisions and are short term. They are not treated here. Neither
are suspensions and expulsions of California grammar and junior
high public school pupils treated here. Finally, it should be pointed
out, suspension and expulsion proceedings-indeed, all disciplinary
proceedings-at the junior college level are adequately (though not
necessarily permanently) treated in the very recent California case
of Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College District Board of Trust-
ees."
II. THE CALIFoRmA STATUTORY PLAN
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Laws
At the outset one should be aware that the California Legislature
has the constitutional duty and the power to maintain a system of
free public education in California2, that by statute the Legislature
has delegated the local school boards of the various school districts
the authority to operate the public schools 3 and to promulgate nec-
cessary rules and regulations controlling student conduct 4, and that
students are required to comply with such regulations 5 under pain
of suspension 6, or, if necessary, expulsion. 7
School boards are prohibited by Education Code section 10751
from permitting access to any written records of pupils, except as
provided in the statute. They are generally required by the Brown
Act8 and Education Code section 966 to conduct their business in
open and public meetings, but are authorized by Education Code sec-
1. 9 Cal. App. 3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970), petition for hearing by
Cal. Sup. Ct. denied Sept. 24, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Perlman].
2. CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 5 (1879).
3. CAL. EDuC. CODE § 921 (West 1969).
4. Id. § 10604.5.
5. Id. § 10609.
6. Id. §§ 10607, 10607.5 deals with the limited duration.
7. Id. § 10604.3; see also id. § 10603 which deals with the specific au-
thority to suspend or expel students for sale, use or possession of narcotics
on and off campus.
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-60.
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tion 967, as an express exception to the Brown Act and Education
Code section 966, to hold executive, that is, closed, sessions to "con-
sider the expulsion, suspension or disciplinary action in connection
with any pupil of the school district, if a public hearing would
violate the non-disclosure provisions of Education Code section
10751." However, Education Code section 967 requires that before
calling an executive session to consider pupil disciplinary matters,
*. . the governing board ... shall, in writing, by registered or
certified mail or by personal service, if the pupil is a minor, notify
the pupil and his parent or guardian... of the intent of the gov-
erning board ... to call and hold such an executive session. Un-
less the pupil, or his parent, or guardian shall, in writing, within
48 hours after receipt of such written notice of intention, request
that the hearing of the governing board be held as a public meeting,
then the hearing to consider such matters may be conducted by
the governing board in executive session.9
If a pupil is expelled, an inter-agency administrative appeal to
the county board of education is available to the parent or guardian
of the pupil under Education Code section 10608 and the county
board, upon request, "shall hold a hearing thereon and render its
decision. The decision of the county board of education shall be
final and binding upon the parent or guardian and the governing
board expelling the pupil."
Although no reported California case has squarely held that
sections 967 or 10608 of the Education Code requires that a pupil be
given notice of the charges and an opportunity to present a defense
before being expelled from a public school, it is probable that such
requirements would be held to be implied in the language of these
sections. Assuming that California public school pupils have a right
to notice and a hearing before being expelled, still no particular
form of hearing is prescribed by statute, and neither the county
board of education nor the school boards in California have the
power to subpoena witnesses-for either side-or to compel the wit-
nesses to testify if they do appear voluntarily.
Judicial Review
It can be expected that section 10608 of the Education Code will
be construed as being the final administrative decision required be-
fore the parent or guardian of the expelled pupil can seek judicial
9. CAL. EDUc. CODE § 967 (West 1969).
review in the California courts.10 Should the California courts de-
termine that the final administrative decision is the result of a pro-
ceeding "in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence
is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts
is vested in the... board", 1 then administrative mandamus under
the provisions of section 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure is the appropriate method to seek judicial review in the Cali-
fornia courts.' 2
As we shall see, since the landmark decision in 1961 in Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education,13 a second alternative forum-
the federal district court-is also available to review the expulsion
under the Civil Rights Act.' 4
III. DIXON AND ITS HISToIcA DEVELOPMENT
The Case and Its Rule
In the spring of 1960, several students at Alabama State College
for Negroes were expelled ex parte by the Alabama State Board of
Education after a series of student lunch counter sit-ins and mass
demonstrations in Montgomery and Tuskegee, Alabama. The mis-
conduct for which the students were expelled was, however, never
definitely specified.
The students filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama under the Civil Rights Act 5 , seek-
ing preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the State
Board of Education and others from obstructing their right to at-
tend college.
10. See, Noonan v. Green, 276 Cal. App. 2d 25, 31, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513, 517(1969).
11. CAY. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1094.5 (a) (West 1954).
12. For appropriateness of administrative mandamus see discussion in
Goldberg v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), [hereinafter cited as Goldberg], pet. for hearing by
Cal. Sup. Ct. denied.
For a thorough discussion of CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1954), see
W. DEERmG, CAIFORNIA Anirus AsTR z MsAN-wus (1966), published by Cal.
Continuing Educ. of the Bar.
13. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1343 (3). The Act confers original jurisdiction
upon federal district courts of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person
1343 (3). To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privi-
lege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
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The federal district court denied injunctive relief'-, assigning as
reasons therefor:
1. The right to attend a public college is not in and of itself
a constitutional right;
2. The right to attend a public college is conditioned upon the
student's compliance with the rules and regulations of the in-
stitution;
3. The State Board of Education had the authority to and did
establish reasonable rules and regulations for the government
of the institution; and
4. "The courts have consistently upheld the validity of regula-
tions that have the effect of reserving to the college the right
to dismiss students at any time for any reason without divulg-
ing its reason other than its being for the general benefit of
the institution."
The students, represented by several attorneys, including the now
Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, appealed the decision to the Fifth
Circuit. Reversing and remanding the case, the Circuit Court
held that due process requires notice and "some" opportunity for a
hearing before a student at a tax-supported institution of higher
learning can be expelled for misconduct.
The Dixon Analysis
In the well-reasoned opinion written by Circuit Judge Rives, the
Circuit Court declared at the outset:
Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual,
the Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process
of law.17
Demise of the Right v. Privilege and Waiver Arguments
Even while recognizing that the right to attend a public college is
16. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 186 F. Supp. 945, 951
(M.D. Ala. 1960). The district court relied upon Waugh v. Board of Trustees
of the Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ.
of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Lucy v. Board of Trustees (D.C. N.D. Ala. CA.
No. 652); and the authorities referred to in 14 C.J.S. Colleges and Uni-
versities § 26 (1939); 55 Am. Jura Universities and Colleges § 22 (1946); and
79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 503 (b) (1952).
17. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th
Cir. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
not in and of itself a constitutional rightI8 , the Dixon court never-
theless dealt the underlying "privilege" argument a deadly blow by
quoting from Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy
One may not have a constitutional right to go to Bagdad, but the
Government may not prohibit one from going there unless by
means consonant with due process of law.19
The defendants contended that the parties-the student on the one
hand and the college on the other-had entered into a voluntary re-
lationship with each other, which relationship could be terminated
at will by either; therefore, the students' "privilege" of attendance
could be and had been conditioned upon their "agreement" to abide
by the college's regulation which had the effect of reserving to the
college the right to dismiss them ex parte if the relationship became
unpleasant or difficult for the college. "Not so", according to the
Dixon court. Relying upon the holdings of the Supreme Court in
public employment cases, 20 the court rejected the "privilege" and
"'waiver" arguments out of hand, ruling:
... the State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege
18. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 40 (1874) where defendant's brief
points out:
The right of admission to our public schools is not one of those
privileges and immunities [under the Fourteenth Amendment].
They were unknown, as they now exist, at the time of the adoption
of the Federal Constitution; that instrument is silent upon the
subject of education, and our public schools are wholly the creation
of our own State Constitution and State Laws.
See, to the same effect: Bradford v. Board of Education, 18 Cal. App. 19
(1912); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245
(1934).
19. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
20. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) the Court struck
down the condition of a loyalty oath saying:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro-
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursu-
ant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of N.Y. City, 350 U.S. 551, 555
(1955) the Court struck down ex parte dismissal of teacher who had been
fired for utilizing the privilege against self-incrimination, saying:
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to gov-
ernment employment is only to say that he must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory terms laid down by
the proper authorities.
and in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1961) the Court struck down the
condition that public school employees must file affidavits annually list-
ing without limitation every organization to which they belonged or con-
tributed for the preceding five years, saying:
[Elven though the government purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved. The breadth of the legislative abridgement must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.
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upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due
process.21
Private School Precedents Distinguished
Moreover, the Circuit Court found that the district court
had erroneously relied upon precedent relating to private universi-
ties and upon the well-settled rule that the relations between a stu-
dent and a private university are a matter of contract. Referring
instead to the governing precedents for public colleges collected in
58 A.L.R.2d 903-20, the Circuit Court noted that "none held that
no hearing whatsoever was required. '2 2
The Procedural Due Process Balancing Test
To test whether the ex parte procedure observed the "rudiments
of fair play", the Dixon court adopted the criteria suggested by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath23, and balanced the authority of the
college to discipline students for misconduct against the valuable
interest of the student to remain in school.
The Private Interest in Staying in School. In plain and powerful
language the Dixon court described the precise nature of the private
interest involved in the expulsion of a student from a tax supported
institution of higher learning:
It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and,
indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education the
plaintiffs would not be able to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill
as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good
citizens.
•... Surely no one can question that the right to remain at the
college in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing is an
interest of extremely great value.2 4
That the nature of this private interest has remained substantially
21. Dixon, supra note 17, at 156.
22. Id. at 158.
23. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951), concurring opinion:
1. The precise nature of the interest that was adversely affected;
2. The manner in which this was done;
3. The reasons for doing it;
4. The available alternatives to the procedure that was followed;
5. The protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose
conduct is challenged; and
6. The balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished.
24. Dixon, supra note 17, at 157.
unchanged over the last century is attested to by noting the answer
which a Pennsylvania County Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Hill
v. McCauley25 gave in 1886 to the assertion that the courts may not
inquire into a student's complaint that he has suffered unmerited
injuries at the hands of his teachers so long as the teachers aver
them to have been disciplinary in nature:
This is a grave proposition when it is considered that there are
tens of thousands of youth continually in attendance at colleges,
many of whom are of mature age and any of whom may suffer deg-
redation and irreparable injury to reputation as well as pecuniary
loss, by the unjust action of a faculty.26
It is appropriate to digress at this point to consider the nature
of the interest of public school pupils to remain in school. That
California public school children have an equal or greater interest
than do their college-level counterparts in remaining in school can
not be denied. For example, in Ward v. Flood2 7 the California Su-
preme Court in 1874, discussing the value of an education to public
school children, recounted the common law duty to educate the chil-
dren:
The education of youth is emphatically their protection. Ignorance,
the lack of mental and moral culture in earlier life, is the recog-
nized parent of vice and crime in after years. Thus it is the
acknowledged duty of the parent or guardian, as part of the mea-
sure of protection which he owes to a child or ward, to afford him
at least a reasonable opportunity for the improvement of his mind
and the elevation of his moral condition, and, of this duty the law
took cognizance long before the now recognized interest of society
and the body politic in the education of its members had prompted
its embarkation upon a general system of education of youth. So
a ward in chancery, as being entitled to the protection of the Court,
was always entitled to be educated under its direction as constitut-
ing a most important part of that protection. 28
Pointing out that the opportunity of a free public education was af-
forded to the youth of California by statute, enacted pursuant to the
special mandate of the California Constitution, 29 directing that the
Legislature provide for a system of common schools, the California
Supreme Court in very blunt language said:
The advantage or benefit thereby vouchsafed to each child, of at-
tending a public school is, therefore, one derived and secured to it
under the highest sanction of positive law. It is, therefore, a right
-a legal right-as distinctively so as the vested right in property
owned is a legal right, and as such it is protected, and entitled to be
25. Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1886)
[hereinafter cited as McCauley].
26. Id. at 86.
27. 48 Cal. 36 (1874) [hereinafter cited as Ward].
28. Ward at 51.
29. CAL. CoNsT. art. XIX, § 3 (1849); now CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1879).
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protected by all the guarantees by which other legal rights are pro-
tected and secured to the professor.30
No exhaustive review of the constitutions and laws of the several
states is needed to find that California was not unique in early con-
ferring upon its children the right to a public school education. In
fact, much earlier-1845--the state of Massachusetts had already
gone much further. By statute the parents, guardian or custodian
of a child who had been refused admission to or excluded from the
public schools of Massachusetts could recover damages in an action
in tort against the town for unlawful exclusion. 31 At least since
1902, and perhaps before, school committes in Massachusetts have
been prohibited by statute from permanently excluding a pupil
from the public schools for alleged misconduct without first giving
him an opportunity to be heard. And in Pennsylvania, at least since
1911, and perhaps earlier, boards of school directors have been au-
thorized to suspend or permanently expel a pupil, but only after a
"proper hearing. 3 2 It is probably safe to assume that today the
public school children throughout the land enjoy a right under the
constitutions of the several states to a public education, even though
there is no federal constitutional right to attend the public schools.
The Power to Expel. The measure of the power to expel is the
scope of judicial review to which it is subjected.
The traditional position of the state courts has been that the en-
forcement of disciplinary rules is committed to the school officials
and not to the courts, and the courts will not interfere with the dis-
cretion of the school officials in matters which the law has conferred
to their judgment, unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion, or
arbitrary or unlawful action. In essence the state courts have
adopted a policy of judicial restraint.33
30. Ward at 50.
31. See, Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N.E. 400 (1902);
Jones v. City of Fitchburg, 211 Mass. 66, 97 N.E. 612 (1912); Lenord v. School
Committee of Attleborro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
32. See, Geiger v. Milford Independent School District, 51 Pa. D. & C. 647
6 Mon. Leg. R. 73 (1941); and Mando v. Wesleyville School Board, 81 Pa.
D. & C. 125, 35 Erie Co. L.J. 74 (1952) for conflicting decisions as to the
meaning of a "proper hearing".
33. Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904)
[hereinafter cited as Morrison]; State v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433
(1928) (college students); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99,
171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied 319 U.S. 748 (1942) (college students)
[hereinafter cited as Hyman].
Until the Dixon decision, there existed a long-standing federal
court doctrine of abstention. As late as 1959 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in Steier v.
New York State Education Commissioner" on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Steier, a student at Brook-
lyn College, a unit of the public school system of the State of New
York, after being expelled, filed suit under the Civil Rights Act.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said:
Education is a field of life reserved to the individual states ....
As so well stated by Judge Wyzanski in Cranney v. Trustees of
Boston University, D.C., 139 F. Supp. 130, to expand the Civil
Rights Statute so as to embrace every constitutional claim such as
here made would in fact bring within the initial jurisdiction of the
United States District Courts that vast array of controversies
which have heretofore been raised in state tribunals by challenges
founded upon the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. It would be arrogating to United States District Courts that
which is purely a State Court function. Conceivably every State
College student, upon dismissal from such college, could rush to a
Federal judge seeking review of the dismissal.
It is contrary to the Federal nature of our system-contrary to the
concept of the relative places of State and Federal Courts.
Whether or not we would have acted as did the Administrator of
Brooklyn College in dismissing the plaintiff matters not. For a
Federal District Court to take jurisdiction of a case such as this
would lead to confusion and chaos in the entire field of jurispru-
dence in the states and in the United States. 3 5
Circuit Judge Cameron of the Dixon court, in a strong dissent, rec-
ommended that the federal abstention doctrine be adhered to, warn-
ing that a departure "would result in a major blow to our institu-
tions of learning" and that "[e]very attempt at discipline would
probably lead to a cause cgl bre, in connection with which federal
functionaries would be rushed in to investigate whether a federal
law had been violated. 3 6
In opening the door of the federal judicial system to students by
expanding the Civil Rights Act, the Dixon court took its cue from
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had re-
fused, with few exceptions, to interfere in the field of education
prior to 1943, taking the position that the functions of education
offices in states, counties and school districts were such that to in-
terfere with their authority "would in effect make [the Court] the
school board for the country."37 Between 1943 and 1960 the Court
had, however, increasingly departed from that position, particularly
34. 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
35. Id. at 18.
36. Dixon, supra note 17, at 165.
37. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).
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where the Equal Protection Clause 38 or First Amendment Rights of
students were involved. Warning of the departure, the Supreme
Court in the 1943 "flag salute" case of Board of Education v. Bar-
nette39 said:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards
of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, deli-
cate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights ....
[N] one who acts under color of law is beyond the reach of the
Constitution.
Against this background of diminishing judicial restraint, or, al-
ternatively, increasing judicial involvement by the Supreme Court,
the Dixon court, sitting in the South seven years after Brown v.
Board of Education-in the midst of the student-led civil rights
movement-conceded the governmental power to expel students for
misconduct; however, it cautioned that the power was not unlim-
ited, could not be arbitrarily exercised, and henceforth was subject
to federal judicial review under the Civil Rights Act. As we shall
see, it was the departure from the "hands off" policy of the federal
courts, rather than the rule laid down in Dixon, which made it a
landmark decision.
The Good Done v. The Injury Inflicted. The Dixon court reached
the conclusion that in the absence of immediate danger to the pub-
lic, or of peril to the national security, a school board should not
deny students at least the fundamental principles of fairness by giv-
ing the accused students notice of the charges and an opportunity
to be heard. The chilling effect of a summary proceeding upon
the students and others aware of the injustice far outweighs any
possible good thought to be accomplished by a speedy, permanent
removal of the students from the campus.40
The Skeleton: The DixoN Guidelines
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.
' "Due process", unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances.' It is 'compounded of history, reason, the past course of
38. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
39. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
40. Dixon, supra note 17, at 157.
decisions.. .'41
For those attuned to the sophisticated adversary machinery of
the courtroom and unfamiliar with the parental disciplinary machin-
ery of the schoolroom, the Dixon guidelines may come as something
of a surprise. It will be well to keep in mind as this discussion pro-
ceeds that just as there is a body of common law from which our
judicial procedures have sprung, there is also a body of common law
from which our present school laws have developed. Under the
"common law of the schools" student disciplinary hearings have
traditionally been conducted by a school teacher, or administrator,
or disciplinary body in an informal atmosphere and in a "bifur-
cated" manner, with the teacher, administrator or disciplinary body
first receiving information against the pupil, and then, requesting
the pupil to come in and explain or refute the charges.
Although the Dixon court ushered in a new forum for review-
ing school disciplinary cases and expressly placed the protective
mantle of the federal constitution upon the proceedings, it did not
depart from the existing majority view as expressed in the cases
spanning the preceding sixty years when it developed, by way of
dicta, the "rudimentary elements of fair play" which, in its opinion,
would satisfy the minimum requirements of procedural due process
in student expulsion hearings. As will become evident, these now
oft-quoted and oft-adopted guidelines are quite definitely com-
pounded of history, reason and the past course of decisions.
Guideline: The Hearing is Informal
Ought student disciplinary hearings be elevated to the
procedural level of criminal or, at least, civil trials?
The state courts had wrestled with this question for many years.
The majority had concluded "no". The dilemma which the question
poses was aptly stated by a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas a
scant 9 years before Dixon:
While we recognize that expulsion or suspension from school is
a serious thing to a child whose education is an important element
of his development, we must also recognize that discipline is an
absolute necessity in the operation of a school. A school with no
discipline is no school at all. In this respect then, the welfare of the
majority of the students must be made paramount to that of the
individual. This is undoubtedly another reason why the legislature
never intended full dress, formal hearings in matters involving
school discipline. A contrary conclusion would undermine the
entire disciplinary machinery of the school system.42
41. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1960).
42. Mando v. Wesleyville School Board 81 Pa. D. & C. 125, 128, 35 Erie
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A half-century earlier, another Penhsylvania court, grappled
with the problem and reached the opposite conclusion in Comamon-
wealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley43, a case involving the expulsion
of a college student. Relying on the common law governing judicial
proceedings rather than the common law of the schools, the Mc-
Cauley court rejected the in loco parentis doctrine as being inap-
plicable to college age students.44 It also rejected the arguments
that formal, judicial-type trials were contrary to long-standing "cus-
tom"; that they would result in the end of all discipline in education-
al institutions, impair the institutions' efficiency, and open the flood
gates to a new and innumerable class of suitors in the courts. Hold-
ing that college-level students were entitled to full-dress judicial
hearings, with the right to confront and cross-examine their accus-
ers, the McCauley court in rather dramatic language declared:
There need be no apprehension of such direful results from the
declaration of the doctrine that the dismissal of students from col-
leges should be in accordance with those principles of justice which
existed even in Pagan times, before the dawn of Christianity, and
which are recognized as controlling in the determination of the
rights of men in every civilized nation on the globe.4 5
Relying on school "custom", a circuit court in Ohio, in 1901 in
Koblitz v. The Western Reserve University46 tempered the McCau-
ley rule and expressed what was to become the majority view with
regard to public college students:
... in determining whether a student has been guilty of improper
conduct that will tend to demoralize the school, it is not necessary
that the professors should go through the formality of a trial.
They should give the student ... every fair opportunity of showing
his innocence.... Be careful in receiving evidence against him;
... weigh it; determine whether it comes from a source freighted
with prejudice; determine the likelihood by all surrounding cir-
cumstances, as to who is right, and then act upon it as jurors
with calmness, consideration and fair minds. When they have
done this and reached a conclusion, they have done all that the law
Co. L.J. 74, 77-78 (1952). The Pennsylvania statute required a "proper
hearing" before expulsion of a public school pupil; the court was faced with
determining whether a "proper hearing" meant a full-dress judicial trial.
43. 3 Pa. County Ct. at 84.
44. The in loco parentis doctrine ascribes to the relation between stu-
dent and a teacher or dean or principal the relationship which exists be-
tween parent and child. The doctrine asserts there is no more justifica-
tion for interference by the courts with the discipline in the former than
in the latter relation. See Goldberg, supra note 10 (for the final demise of
the doctrine in California as applied to university level students).
45. McCauley, supra note 25, at 87.
46. 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 157 (1901) [hereinafter cited as Koblitz].
requires of them to do.47
The Koblitz court's rationale was that the school authorities were
not trying the student for a criminal offense as a civil court, and
that they were helpless to pronounce the judgment of the civil au-
thorities upon him. The only question which the school authori-
ties were considering was whether it was detrimental to the good
discipline and the good morals of the school to allow the accused
student to remain in school. 48
In the 1904 public school expulsion case of Morrison v. City of
Lawrence,4 9 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massacusetts recognized
that the school committee was not such a special tribunal as had the
power to summon or compel the attendance of witnesses or before
whom witnesses could be compelled to attend and give evidence.
Therefore, if an accused student summoned witnesses in his defense
and they refused to come, their attendance could not be enforced,
and even if the witnesses came voluntarily and then refused to tes-
tify, there was no power in the school committee to compel them to
testify. Thus, so far as the student's case depended on the evidence
of such witnesses, the student would have been remediless. The
court concluded that the "hearing", which was required by the
Massachusetts statute to be held before the school committee could
permanently expel a public school pupil, did not have to take on all
the formalities of a trial usual in a court of law, nor was it neces-
sarily to be governed by the strict rules of evidence.
Echoing the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska in 1907 in the public school expulsion case
of Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt5 reached the conclusion
that "no trial, in the sense of a judicial inquiry" was contemplated
under the Nebraska statute. The Vermillion court asked the rhe-
torical questions: By what process is the attendance of witnesses
to be assured? If they attend, who is to administer the oath or pun-
ish for a refusal to be sworn? What punishment could be inflicted
upon those giving false testimony? The Vermillion court expressed
the view that the proceeding was to be more like the action of an
administrative board in making inquiry as to existing facts upon
which the board was required to act, and concluded that the board
could use its own judgment and pursue any course which, in its
opinion, would fully inform the members of the board of the facts
attending the subject matter of the inquiry.5 1
47. Id. at 157.
48. Id.
49. Supra note 33.
50. 78 Neb. 107, 110; 110 N.W. 736, 737 (1907).
51. Id.
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The Branch Appellate Court of Illinois, reviewing the expulsion of
a public school pupil, held in 1913 in Smith v. Board of Education5 2
that since the Illinois statutes prescribed no particular form of trial
or hearing the school board was authorized to investigate the
charges in a "reasonable and parliamentary way" and to suspend or
expel any whom the board found guilty of violation of their reason-
able and valid rules.
In State v. Clapp5 3, a case involving the suspension of a college
student in 1928, the full-dress judicial trial requirement of McCau-
ley was soundly repudiated by a Montana court as being "wholly
impractical and unworkable". The court pierced to the very heart
of the problem when it pointed out that in the absence of the power
to subpoena witnesses, to hold that the power of suspension could
only be exercised after a full-dress judicial trial would be to hold
that the power to suspend was practically ineffective, except where
the witnesses voluntarily attended and testified. The court said:
"Such a rule would be destructive of the power vested in the
[board] .,54
Citing Clapp and Koblitz, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1944
in State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman5 5 also repudiated the McCauley
rule in reviewing the expulsion of medical students from the Uni-
versity of Tennessee, saying:
This is not a proceeding in a court of law.... The case of Com-
monwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley is not in accord with the
weight of authority and we do not choose to follow it.56
The Hyman court considered that it would be subversive of the
best interests of the school and harmful to the community to sub-
ject student accusers to cross-examination.
If the McCauley rule was not dead at the time of the Dixon deci-
sion, Dixon inflicted the coup de grace, for the Dixon court de-
scribed the hearing required by due process prior to expulsion in
these general terms:
The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. The case before us requires some-
52. 182 1ll. App. 342, 346 (1913).
53. 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433 (1928).
54. Id. at 215-16, 263 P. at 437.
55. Supra note 33.
56. Id. at 108-09, 171 S.W.2d at 82.
thing more than an informal interview with an administrative au-
thority of the college. By its nature, a charge of misconduct ...
depends upon a collection of the facts concerning the charged
misconduct, easily colored by the point of view of the wit-
nesses. In such circumstances, a hearing which gives the Board or
the administrative authorities of the college an opportunity to hear
both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights
of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hear-
ing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such
a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college
activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational at-
mosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudi-
ments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without en-
croaching upon the interests of the college.57
Guideline: Some Rudiments of an Adversary Proceeding
are Necessary
To say that students may be expelled without full-dress judicial
hearings is not to say that within the framework of the informal bi-
furcated hearing there is no procedural safeguard which can be af-
forded in lieu of confrontation and cross-examination or that afl
procedural safeguards known to a court of law may be denied.
Notice of the Charges. The Dixon guideline that "[t] he notice
of the charges should contain a statement of the specific charges
and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the
regulations of the Board of Education '5 8 merely reaffirmed the
views consistently expressed in earlier state court decisions.59
Notice of the Names and Testimony of Accusers. Even though a
student has no right to confront and cross-examine his accusers
face to face, the Dixon court said he "should be given the names of
the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on the facts
to which each witness testifies."6 9 This guideline is a combination
of elements of the McCauley and Hyman guidelines and carries with
it implicit recognition by the Dixon court of the "bifurcated" na-
ture of the hearing, assuming as it does that before the student ap-
pears at the "hearing", the disciplinary body will have already re-
ceived the information against him.
The reference in the Dixon guideline to furnishing to the student
"an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testi-
fies" is better placed in perspective when one is familiar with the
procedures used in State ex rel. Sherman v. Hymano1 upon which
57. Dixon, supra note 17, at 158-59 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 158.
59. See McCauley, supra note 25; Hyman, supra note 33.
60. Dixon, supra note 17, at 159.
61. Hyman, supra note 33.
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the Dixon court obviously relied.62 In Hyman, medical students
at the University of Tennessee were ultimately accused of selling
examination questions. When it first came to the attention of the
administration that examination questions were being stolen and
that some at least were being sold, a student council was formed to
conduct an investigation and make its recommendations to the fac-
ulty disciplinary committee. The council consisted of students and
the dean. During the course of the investigation, testimony was
elicited from numerous students and the "finger of guilt" settled on
the plaintiffs, who were called before the council and told that the
council had evidence connecting them with the thefts and sales.
Plaintiffs denied their guilt. The council recommended their ex-
pulsion. Plaintiffs were given notice to appear before the faculty
disciplinary committee. No accusing witnesses appeared at this
hearing; instead, the dean orally reported to the committee, in the
presence of plaintiffs, the substance of the testimony that had been
offered against the plaintiffs during the student council investiga-
tion. The plaintiffs were expelled. They appealed to the board of
trustees. A special committee of the board was appointed to hear
the appeal. No accusing witness appeared at the appellate hearing.
Plaintiffs, through their counsel, demanded the presence of the ac-
cusing witnesses and the right to cross-examine them. The demand
was denied. The dean orally reported the substance of the testi-
mony against the plaintiffs. The expulsions were upheld, and
plaintiffs filed suit in the state court. Relying upon Koblitz, Clapp,
Vermillion, Smith and Morrison, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
held that the proceedings had met the requirements of the law. In
its guidelines, the Hyman court said:
We think the student should be informed as to ... the names of at
least the principal witnesses against him when requested .... He
cannot claim the privilege of cross-examination as a matter of
right. The testimony against him may be oral or written, not nec-
essarily under oath, but he should be advised as to its nature, as
well as the persons who have accused him.6s
The inherent injustice of an informal bifurcated hearing at which
the pupil is given no information as to the names of his accusers
and the testimony which they gave against him was well pointed
62. See also Morrison, supra note 30. The Morrison court approved the
procedure where testimony offered against the pupil by the principal and
the teachers was in the form of written rather than oral statements.
63. Hyman, supra note 33, at 108; 171 S.W.2d at 826.
up in Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauleyG4 where the college
student's expulsion was based upon information furnished by a fel-
low student to one member of the disciplinary committee, who, in
turn, reported the information, but not the name of the informant,
to his brethren on the committee. McCauley was then called in
and told of the charges of misconduct against him and allowed to
defend himself as best he could under the circumstances, but he was
not told the name of the student informant or the nature of the
second-hand testimony which the committee member had related to
the balance of the Committee. The McCauley court decried:
Such secondary evidence as that of . . . the student referred to,
ought not to be and would not be received as competent testimony
in the determination of the most trivial rights in the most petty
tribunal in the land.65
Undoubtedly this kangaroo proceeding materially influenced the
McCauley court in holding that a college student should be given a
full dress judicial trial before being expelled for misconduct. The
McCauley court said the student
... was entitled to know what testimony had been given against
him, and by whom it had been delivered,... and that the proofs
be made openly and in his presence, with a full opportunity to
question the witnesses and to call others to explain or contradict
their testimony.66
Opportunity to Present Defense. The Dixon court said the stu-
dent "should. . . be given the opportunity to present . . . his own
defense against the charges and to introduce either oral testimony
or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf."07 It is not enough
for the school authorities merely to pay lip service to procedure.
While it is not necessary that the student have actually presented a
defense in order to satisfy the "rudiments of fair play"0 8, he must
have been given an opportunity to do so, and the opportunity must
have been a fair one.69 An opportunity may be completely value-
less if relevant evidence, when offered in defense, is refused ad-
mission or those who otherwise would testify in behalf of the stu-
dent are prevented from doing so by an action of the school officials
who are hearing the case. The law presumes that when called upon,
the school officials will listen patiently to the student's case as
fully as the student wishes to present it, so long as such presentation
does not range beyond the legitimate limit of the issues involved.
64. McCauley, supra note 25.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id. at 82.
67. Dixon, supra note 17, at 159.
68. 81 Mont. at 215-16, 263 P. at 437.
69. Koblitz, supra note 46, at 157; see also Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb.
107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
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On the one hand, the school authorities are required to grant the
student a full opportunity to be heard upon the facts, to hear and
consider the testimony of such witnesses as he might call, and per-
mit him to fully present his case in such orderly manner as the
school authorities may direct; on the other hand, if it appears that
a fair opportunity to be heard has been given and the student has
been allowed to present the merits of his case, then mere non-prej-
udicial error committed in the admission or exclusion of evidence
will not be enough to make invalid a final adverse decision.70
When Findings are Required. Concluding its guidelines, the
Dixon court said that "[i] f the hearing is not before the Board di-
rectly the results and findings of the hearing should be presented
in a report open to the student's inspection."'71 Thus, Dixon recog-
nized the long-standing custom in the schools to commit the disci-
pline of the schools very largely, if not wholly, to the teacher.72
IV. POST-DIXON DEVELOPIENTS
Introduction
In enunciating the rule that due process requires notice and some
opportunity for a hearing before a student at a tax-supported insti-
tution of higher learning can be expelled for misconduct, Dixon re-
lied, as we have seen, upon a long line of precedent involving sus-
pensions and expulsions of students from public institutions of
higher learning and expulsions of public school pupils in states
where the public school pupil was by statute entitled to an oppor-
tunity for a hearing before being expelled.73
Expansion of Scope of Dixon Rule
Expansion Horizontally to Include All Public College
Disciplinary Actions
It should come as no surprise that the state and federal courts
since the Dixon decision in 1961 have applied the Dixon rule to pub-
lic higher education disciplinary actions which were tantamount to
70. Morrison, supra note 33, at 457, 72 N.E. at 92.
71. Dixon, supra note 17, at 159.
72. Koblitz, supra note 46, at 155.
73. See, Dixon, supra note 17, at 157-58.
expulsion, such as "indefinite suspensions"7 4 and "denials of appli-
cations for readmission or reregistration",75 or to suspension". It
was to be less expected that the judiciary would also apply the
Dixon rule to public higher education disciplinary actions involving
probation and "suspension with immediate reinstatement", but at
least one federal court has done so.7 7
Expansion Downward to Include Public Schools, But
Limited to Expulsions and Long-Term Suspensions
In the decade since Dixon there have been but few reported cases
dealing with a public school pupil's right to a hearing before being
suspended or expelled, but those that have been reported clearly
indicate that the judiciary is in the process of enunciating a general
rule that due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing before a public school pupil may be subjected to a long-term
suspension or to expulsion, whether or not the pupil is entitled un-
der state law to a hearing before such a suspension or expulsion.
Less than three years after Dixon, the Fifth Circuit had before
it the case of Woods v. Wright, Superintendent of the Schools of the
City of Birmingham78 involving Alabama public high school pupils,
some of whom had been suspended ex parte on May 20 for the re-
mainder of the school year and others who had been expelled ex
parte, all for allegedly participating in an off-campus, peaceful dem-
onstration against racial segregation in the City of Birmingham. A
parent of one of the suspended pupils filed suit in the federal court
under the Civil Rights Act, challenging the ex parte disciplinary
74. See, Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963);
Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
75. See, Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. App. 1966); Schiff v. Hannah,
282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 392
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).
76. See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.
Mo. 1967) (duration of suspension not reflected in reported case); Goldberg,
supra note 10 (6-week suspension for one student; 5 month suspension for
another); Baker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968), aff'd 399
F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (duration of suspension not reflected in reported
case); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968) (suspension with
permission to reapply at the end of semester) [hereinafter cited as Buttny];
Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wise. 1968) (ex parte suspension
with hearing only upon request); Sticklin v. Regents of the University of
Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (ex parte suspension with
hearing indefinitely delayed due to alleged danger to person and prop-
erty).
77. Buttny, supra note 76.
78. 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964).
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action as constituting, inter alia, a deprival of due process of law.
Appeal was filed in the Fifth Circuit upon the district court's denial
of the requested temporary restraining order, and the Fifth Circuit
granted an application for an injunction pending appeal by which
the Superintendent and all persons in concert with him were en-
joined from continuing to enforce the suspensions and expulsions.
The denials of temporary restraining orders are usually not ap-
pealable, but in this case the Fifth Circuit determined that the
denial of the temporary restraining order was a final and appeal-
able order because the effect of the denial was to moot or nearly
moot the claims since there was not sufficient time for the applica-
tion on the preliminary injunction to be heard and acted upon be-
fore the end of the school year. In reversing the denial of the
temporary restraining order, the Fifth Circuit did not have square-
ly before it at that time the question of whether the ex parte sus-
pension and expulsions of public school pupils are violative of due
process of law, but the action which it did take to protect the pu-
pils, coupled with the language of the opinion, leaves little doubt
that the Fifth Circuit was of the opinion that the Superintendent
would be well advised to "recognize and concede the constitutional
rights for which the appellants contend" and follow the court's sug-
gestion to look toward a consent decree.79
In the much cited case of Madera v. The Board of Education of
the City of New York80 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had be-
fore it in 1967 the question of whether a seventh grade pupil was
entitled to have legal representation at a District Superintendent's
"guidance conference" held to consider the situation of the pupil
who was at the time under an ex parte administrative suspense
pending a decision by the District Superintendent as to whether the
pupil would be returned to the same school, or transferred to an-
other school, or transferred to an adjustment school. Referring to
the ex parte nature of the administrative suspense by the school
principal, the court noted that under the law of New York there was
no requirement that the school authorities grant a hearing prior to
invoking the short term suspension power. The court conceded that
the Dixon rule would apply in the case of public school pupils who
are expelled, but found that the guidance conference was only a
79. Id. at 375.
80. 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
preliminary investigation and pointed out that the demands of due
process do not require a hearing at any particular stage in the disci-
plinary process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the
final order of expulsion becomes effective. Having concluded ini-
tially that the guidance conference was not a "hearing" in the due
process sense, the court then went on to hold that even if due
process was applicable to the guidance conference, the parent and
pupil were not entitled to legal representation.
In 1968 the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division
Two, affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying a writ of
mandate in Akin v. Board of Education of Riverside Unified School
District.8 ' Akin, a 15-year old male, had enrolled in September 1965
in one of the high schools of the respondent district. Shortly there-
after he was suspended (presumably by the high school principal)
when he refused to shave his beard as required by the school
board's clean-shaven policy adopted September 20, 1965. Akin at-
tended i private school for the remainder of the 1965-66 school year
and in March 1966 unsuccessfully appealed to the school board. In
September 1966 he again endeavored to enroll. This time he was
denied admission by order of the high school principal and the dis-
trict superintendent because he refused to remove his beard. He
filed suit in the state court seeking a writ of mandate ordering re-
spondent school board to enroll him. The Court of Appeal assumed
that a pupil enjoys a constitutional right peripherally protected by
the First Amendment to wear a beard as a form of expression, but,
applying the tri-fold test borrowed from the public employment
case of Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District 82, the
court concluded that no alternative less subversive of Akin's right
to wear a beard was available and upheld the school board's clean-
shaven policy. Having so held the Court of Appeal then said, with-
out elaboration:
Furthermore, petitioner was not denied due process before his ex-
pulsion. He was afforded an opportunity to appear before the
board and explain his reasons for desiring to wear a beard.
One interested in the issue of procedural due process can but as-
sume from a reading of the reported case that this issue was a minor
one at best. It is not clear at what stage Akin was given an oppor-
tunity to appear before the board or whether he availed himself of
the opportunity, although one can conjecture that the Court of Ap-
peal has reference to Akin's March 1966 appeal to the school board.
81. 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968), pet. for hearing by
Cal. Sup. Ct. denied.
82. 65 Cal. 2d 449, 501-02, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
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Although the Court of Appeal in its closing remarks characterizes
the case as one of expulsion, the opinion is silent as to the apparent
failure of the pupil to exhaust his administrative remedies by ap-
pealing his expulsion to the county board of education under Edu-
cation Code section 10608 before seeking judicial review.8 3 It is
clear, however, that the Court of Appeal was in accord with the
principle that before expulsion of a public high school pupil, due
process requires an opportunity for a hearing at which the pupil
may make his explanations and present his defense.
The Federal District Court for the Southern Division of Missi-
sippi experienced no difficulty in applying in 1969 the Dixon rule in
holding that public school pupils have a right to notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before being expelled or suspended for long pe-
riods of time. In Brown v. Greer 4 several public school children
were indefinitely suspended ex parte by the school principal for
misconduct. Their parents were immediately notified of the action
by mail and the reasons therefor and were advised of the right to a
hearing before the school board. On November 1 the pupils' at-
torney sent a written demand for a hearing. At the regular meet-
ing of the board on November 4, the Superintendent advised the
board regarding the matter and recommended expulsions. The
board proceeded to expel the pupils ex parte. A mandatory pre-
liminary injunction was sought by the pupils to compel their read-
mission. The district court ordered the school board to conduct a
hearing before December 30 with the pupils and their counsel pres-
ent. At the conclusion of the court-ordered hearing the board re-
scinded its expulsion order and instead suspended the pupils for the
balance of the school year. The pupils challenged the suspensions
on the ground that the court-ordered hearing held by the school
board had not complied with the requirements of due process. The
court, testing the procedures at the court-ordered school board
hearing against the Dixon guidelines, concluded that the hearing
had been sufficient to meet the due process requirements.
Very recently the California Court of Appeal, Third District, ap-
plied the Dixon rule in Perlman v. Shasta Jbint Junior College Dis-
trict8 l in reversing the trial court and upholding the three-day sus-
83. Compare, Noonan v. Green, 276 Cal. App. 2d 25, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513
(1969).
84. 296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
85. Supra note 1.
pension of a junior college student but affirming the trial court's re-
versal of his later expulsion. The court treated the case as involving
university or college-level disciplinary action, and made no refer-
ence to the fact that the junior college is instead a part of the sec-
ondary schools of the California public school system. 6
Putting the Flesh on the Bones of the Dixon Guidelines: The
Present Scene
The informal nature of the expulsion hearing, protected as it was
by the Dixon guidelines and the solid line of precedent behind
them, survived the decade since Dixon virtually intact, and it is
still the majority rule (including California) that a full-dress judi-
dicial trial is not required before expelling a student from a tax-
supported institution of higher learning. It should follow then that
a full-dress judicial trial is not required before taking lesser disci-
plinary action involving college students or before expelling public
school pupils. Certain post-Dixon developments are worthy of
being noted.
When Notice Excused. Under certain circumstances the require-
ment of notice may be excused. In a case involving disciplinary
action which was tantamount to the expulsion of college students,
i.e., "denial of readmission", the giving of notice of the charges was
excused where the school authorities were able to demonstrate that
they had used their best efforts to inform the students of the na-
ture of the charges against them and were precluded from doing so
by the evasive action of the students and the students' failure to
abide by a valid regulation requiring that they keep the university
informed of their current mailing addresses. The Fifth Circuit said
to hold otherwise would be to hold that a university could not take
disciplinary action against a student who could not be contacted
through his own fault.8 7
Form and Timeliness of Notice. When the courts have had op-
portunities to prescribe in advance the procedures to be followed in
particular cases, the court-ordered procedures have included the
requirements of a written form of notice served sufficiently in
advance of the hearing to assure the student ample time to prepare
his defense against the charges.88 It is significant, however, that
86. CAL. EDUc. CODE § 22650; King v. Saddleback Junior College District,
425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).
87. Wright v. Texas Southern University, 392 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1968).
88. See, Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
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when the courts have not had the opportunity to prescribe the pro-
cedures in advance, they have consistently upheld much less formal
notice procedures, stating that the student did not show that he was
thereby prejudiced in presenting his defense. For example, two
days' written notice was sufficient in the indefinite college suspen-
sion case of Jones v. The State Board of Education"9 ; oral notice to
the student at the beginning of the hearing was sufficient in the
suspension case of Due v. Florida A. & M. University"°; and one
hour's advance oral notice was sufficient in the three-day suspen-
sion in Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College District Board of
Trustees.91 It is undoubtedly the better practice to timely serve
written notice of the charges, but the warning sounded by the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Florida only two years after
Dixon should not go unheeded:
Procedures are subject to refinement and improvement in the
never-ending effort to assure, not only fairness, but every sem-
blance of fairness. More specific routines of notice and advisement
may be indicated in this regard, but a foisted system of rigid pro-
cedure can become so ritualistic, dogmatic, and impractical as to
itself be a denial of due process. The touchstones in this area
are fairness and reasonableness. 92
When Notice of Name and Testimony of Accuser May be Excused.
While it is a general rule that the student is entitled to be told of
the names and testimony of his accusers, it may not necessarily con-
stitute a violation of due process not to divulge to him the confi-
dential opinions of members of the faculty as to the student's fitness
to remain in school. But where the contemplated disciplinary ac-
tion is severe, such as expulsion, and the student would thereby be
utterly precluded from defending against such unknown evidence,
an evidentiary hearing by the district court is called for to look
into the nature of the concealed evidence and the reasons for with-
(W.D. Mo. 1967) (suspensions); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.
Mich. 1966) (denial of application to reregister); Marzette v. McPhee, 294
F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (suspension ex parte, hearing only upon
request).
89. 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
90. 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
91. Supra note 1. But the Perlman court noted: "It could very well be
that where charges of infractions of college rules are more than one or
require the presence of witnesses a more formal notice and proceeding
would be required... ." Id. at 568.
92. Due v. Florida A. & M. University, 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla.
1963) (emphasis added).
holding it. 93
Misconduct Need Not Violate any Written Rule. Under the com-
mon law of the schools, conduct which is disruptive of good order
on the campus may properly lead to disciplinary action, whether
the disciplinary powers are invoked under a published or unpub-
lished rule or regulation.94
Hearing Need Not Await Outcome of Criminal Proceeding.
Where the conduct which is the subject of the disciplinary action
is also the subject of a criminal proceeding, the discipline imposed
by the school community need not await the outcome of the crimi-
nal proceeding. Except for the application of constitutional limita-
tions, the relationship between appropriate school rules and the
laws of the outside community is entirely coincidental. The va-
lidity of one does not establish the validity of the other.9 5
No Right to a Public Hearing. A closed hearing does not violate
the due process clause where it appears that the school officials
considered it necessary to conduct a closed hearing in order to
maintain discipline and order on the campus and to avoid inter-
ference with the educational functions.96
Combined Judge-Prosecutor Permitted. Due process does not
forbid the combination of judging and prosecuting in administrative
proceedings such as expulsion hearings. However, it is necessary to
closely review the proceedings in order to protect the fundamental
rights of the parties, and if the record of such proceedings shows
bias and prejudice upon the part of the administrative body, its de-
cision cannot be upheld by the courts.9 7
Combined Judge-Witness Permitted. The application of notice
and hearing requirements to disciplinary proceedings presents
somewhat of a theoretical dilemma when the school officials in
charge of meting out the discipline are witnesses to a student's
misconduct. But it does not constitute a violation. of procedural due
93. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967) (expulsion
of United States Merchant Marine Academy cadet).
94. Buttny, supra note 76, at 286 (suspensions, probation). Cf. Koblitz
supra note 46, at 155 (expulsion); Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51,
148 P. 959 (1915) (expulsion of public school pupil).
95. Goldberg, supra note 10, at 885, 886, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
96. Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 768
(W.D. La. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Zanders] (expulsion); Moore v. Stu-
dent Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968) (indefinite suspension). But, see CAL. EDUc. CODE § 967 which
provides for public hearing upon request of parent or pupil in California
public school system.
97. Perlman, supra note 1 (expulsion).
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process for such school officials to determine what disciplinary ac-
tion is to be taken.9 8
No Right to Counsel. By the weight of authority students have
no right to be represented by counsel in a disciplinary proceeding,
even in the severe case of expulsion.9 9 Nevertheless, in a number
of reported disciplinary cases the students have been permitted by
the school to have legal representation at the hearing.10 0 At least
one federal district court in prescribing procedures to be used at a
court-ordered rehearing before the college authorities included the
right of the students to have counsel and to cross-examine wit-
nesses, but limited the right of representation to advising the stu-
dents at the hearing and prohibited the counsel from taking part in
any cross-examination.' 01
Advising of Right to Remain Silent Not Required. -School offi-
cals are not required to advise a student involved in a disciplinary
proceeding of his right to remain silent.10 2
Hearing Not Subject to Strict Rules of Evidence. Consistent
with the concept of an informal hearing, the strict rules of evi-
dence are not applicable.10 3 The testimony on behalf of either
the school authorities or the student may be in the form of written
statements and hearsay is admissible. 04 Although due process does
98. Wright v. Texas Southern University, 277 F. Supp. 110, 112 (S.D.
Texas 1967), afid 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).
99. See Koblitz, supra note 46, at 154 (expulsion); Madera v. Board of
Education of the City of New York, 386 F.2d 778, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1967)(guidance conference); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 810, 812 (2d
Cir. 1967) (expulsion); Buttny, supra note 76, at 267 (suspension, proba-
tion); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 234, 238 (S.D. W. Va. 1968),
aff'd 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (suspension); Perlman, supra note 1 (3-
day suspension).
100. See Hyman, supra note 33 (expulsion); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d
56, 58 (Fla. App. 1966); Zanders, supra note 96, at 749, 766 (expulsion);
Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (in-
definite suspension); Goldberg, supra note 10 (expulsion and suspensions).
101. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52
(W.D. Mo. 1967) (suspensions).
102. Buttny, supra note 76, at 287 (suspensions, probations).
103. Goldberg, supra note 10 (expulsions, suspensions); Jones v. The
State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (indefinite
suspension); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284
F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (indefinite suspension).
104. Goldberg, supra note 10 (expulsions, suspensions); Buttny, supra
note 76 (suspensions, probation); Morrison, supra note 30 (expulsion of
not require that the student have an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him, in the more recent cases such
opportunities have been afforded. 0 5 The student has no right to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination, 0 6 nor is he entitled
to have evidence, such as marijuana, which was seized as a result
of a search of his dormitory room, excluded under the illegal search
and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. 0 7 But discipli-
nary action cannot stand unless it is supported by "substantial evi-
dence,,.10s
Solving the Problems of Judicial Standards: What One Federal
District Court Did
By September of 1968 the increased number of disciplinary ac-
tions being reviewed by the courts, the great interest of the public
in student discipline, and the violence which erupted on the college
public high school pupils); see guidelines in Hyman, supra note 33 and
Dixon, supra note 16.
105. See, e.g., Zanders, supra note 96 (expulsions); Barker v. Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968), aff'd 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (sus-
pensions); Jones v. The State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968) (indefinite suspension, witnesses not under oath); Buttny,
supra note 76 (suspensions, probations. One witness testified against stu-
dents by affidavit); Brown v. Greer, 296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969)
(long term suspensions); Goldberg, supra note 10 (expulsions, suspensions);
but see the court-ordered procedures in Esteban v. Central Missouri State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (suspensions) where the
students but not their counsel were to be permitted to cross-examine.
106. Goldberg, supra note 10; Madera v. Board of Education of the City
of N.Y., 386 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1967).
107. The school has a reasonable right of inspection and the standard
of "reasonable cause to believe" to justify search of dormitory rooms, even
for the sole purpose of seeking evidence of suspected violations of law, is
lower than the constitutionally protected criminal law standard of "probable
cause". The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit reasonable searches
when the search is conducted by a superior charged with responsibility of
maintaining discipline and order or of maintaining security. Moore v.
Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
108. Jones v. The State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968) citing United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963)
wherein the Supreme Court, in holding that judicial review of an ad-
ministrative decision under the Wunderlich Act is limited to a review of
the record and that the court cannot conduct a de novo hearing at which it
takes additional evidence, said:
The term "substantial evidence" . . . has become a term of art to
describe the basis on which an administrative record is to bejudged by a reviewing court. This standard goes to the reason-
ableness of what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before
it, for a decision may be supported by substantial evidence even
though it could be refuted by other evidence that was not pre-
sented to the decision-making body. (Emphasis supplied by the
Court). 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963).
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campuses in the 1960's impelled the Esteban"9 court, when faced
with three major disciplinary cases, to issue an en banc order en-
titled "General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Sub-
stance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax-Supported Institu-
tions of Higher Education '' 1 0 in an attempt to clearly enunciate re-
liable standards which would henceforth be followed in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances in reviewing disciplinary cases.
The General Order sought to devise a type of "procedural yard-
stick" by which the court could measure the procedures required
in any particular case against the degree to which the penalty im-
posed encroached upon the private interest of the college student in
remaining in school. On its yardstick, such minor disciplinary ac-
tions as reprimand, restriction to campus, guidance counseling, sus-
pension of social or academic privileges, probation and dismissal
with leave to apply for readmission, called for few, if any, pro-
cedural safeguards because the good to be accomplished by the im-
position of intricate, time-consuming, sophisticated procedures
would obviously be far outweighed by the harm such procedures
would do to the educational atmosphere as a result of frustrating
the teaching process and rendering impotent disciplinary control.
Moving up the "procedural yardstick," severe disciplinary actions
such as a final expulsion, indefinite or long-term suspension, dis-
missal with deferred leave to reapply, called for (1) adequate no-
tice in writing of the specific ground or grounds and the nature of
the evidence on which the disciplinary proceedings were based; (2)
an opportunity for a hearing of the student's position, explanations,
and evidence; and (3) that the action be supported by substantial
evidence. Since the severe cases involve only the determination of
whether the student is qualified behaviorally to continue as a mem-
ber of the school community and are not for punitive or deterrent
purposes in the criminal sense, the "procedural yardstick" did not
call for, except in a rare and exceptional case, any of the criminal
law processes such as legal representation, a public hearing, con-
frontation and cross-examination of witnesses, warnings about
privileges, self-incrimination, application of principles of former or
double jeopardy, compulsory production of witness and so on. The
General Order also cautioned, however, that within limits of due
109. Supra note 95.
110. 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968).
process, the colleges and universities must be free to devise various
types of disciplinary procedures relevant to their lawful missions,
consistent with their varying processes and functions, and which
do not impose unreasonable strain on their resources and person-
nel.
V. WHAT TO EXPECT TODAY IN ExPULsION PROCEEDINGS
IN CALIFORNIA PUBLIc HIGH SCHOOLS
From the foregoing review of the Dixon decision, its antecedents,
and the cases following it in both state and federal courts, we may
expect expulsion proceedings in California public high schools to
encompass certain requirements and to be subject to certain limi-
tations, among them the following:
Pupil Entitled to Due Process
The conclusion is inescapable that, whether attendance at a pub-
lic high school in California be a "right" or a "privilege", the valu-
able interest which the high school pupil has in remaining in at-
tendance dictates that he may not be expelled for misconduct ex-
cept in a manner consonant with due process.
Due Process Requires Notice and Fair Hearing
The conclusion is also inescapable that, whether or not the pupil
has a right under state statutes to notice and an opportunity for a
fair hearing before being expelled, the Due Process Clause of the
Federal Constitution confers that right upon him.
A Fair Hearing May Be Informal
The hearing to which the pupil is entitled is not a full-dress ju-
dicial-type trial. The disciplinary process is designed solely to de-
termine whether he shall remain a member of the school commun-
ity, and is not punitive or deterrent in the criminal law sense. He,
therefore, has no right to legal representation, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, warnings about privileges, self-in-
crimination, compulsory production of witnesses, etc., although un-
der Education Code section 967 he has a right to a public hearing,
upon request.
The hearing to which he is entitled is informal and bifurcated, but
he has a right to fair notice of the charges against him, notice of the
names and testimony of his accusers, every fair opportunity to show
his innocence (including the calling of voluntary witnesses in his
behalf and the submission 6f written statements of voluntary wit-
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nesses in his behalf), and to have the school authorities carefully
weigh the evidence and act with calmness, consideration and fair
minds in reaching their decision.
Right to Administrative Appellate Review and Judicial Review
Further, if he is expelled, he has a right to appeal the expulsion
to the county board of education, and after exhausting all ad-
ministrative remedies, he may, as a last resort, choose one of two
forums for judicial review-the state courts by way of administra-
tive mandamus or the federal courts under the Civil Rights Act.
